Losing the Victory   

   Thanks to a friend, a former U.S. Marine who loaned me a book, we just learned more about how Washington turned military victory in Vietnam into disgraceful retreat. 

   This is not about whether we should have been in Vietnam. Those were Cold War times. Russia was supplying the communist North, as it did in Korea. Fifty-seven thousand GIs died while others came home unappreciated and "wounded" in one way or another. Here is a little of their story.

   From April 1967 to April 1968 a major battle occurred on a plateau named Khe Sanh in northwest South Vietnam. 

   We can only guess why the Marines defended this hilly wilderness and its dilapidated bridges, except that the North Vietnamese Army chose this path for its invasion. The NVA could regroup using Route 9 - think of the worst farm road ever - to retreat into Laos where they knew Americans were forbidden to go.

   Vietnamese politician/General Giap, who masterminded the French defeat in 1954, was the strategist. There was no R&R for his soldiers, nor did their "tours" ever end, except when disabled or by death. Some men defected to our side, sharing valuable intelligence. 

   Terrain made it difficult for Marines to resupply; the heaviest armor stayed behind. Fighting was up close and personal, sometimes in monsoon periods of fog and torrential rains. 

   Our rules of engagement involved good intentions. But they hampered military strategy and planning. Surprise bureaucratic changes added to frustration. 

   There was no surprise to bother the enemy. It took U.S. officers an average of 15+ days to get permission from Washington to attack a new target. 

   In 1967 there were 137 days when the Air Force was in stand down, for political reasons. Even when air power was permitted, the North with its weapons depots and massing of troops was off limits. 

Tomorrow: President Johnson, Secretary McNamara and Walter Cronkite

       Jimmy