LBJ vs. General Giap     

   Conclusion.

   President Johnson took charge of the war. He labored over a battlefield display day and night. 

   His foremost adviser was Robert McNamara, secretary of defense. Their strategy was to poke at the enemy, then pull back, waiting for him to talk peace. According to the book's authors, Johnson misunderstood Giap throughout his term in office. 

   The joint chiefs were unable or unwilling to challenge their bosses, leaving commanders in the field cut off. General Westmoreland received criticism during the war, but the Marines say he did all he could with limited authority.

   McNamara was addicted to statistics. To him, officers in the field spoke "Nonsense!" 

   Back then, Democrats controlled Congress, and they were mostly patriots. Incredulous senators questioned admirals and generals about their problems. But nothing changed. 

   With Khe Sanh still in doubt, McNamara ordered a "barrier" to be built along the DMZ. Marines were taken off the battlefield to work like Seabees. Some 750,000 man-days and 115,000 equipment hours were dedicated to the boondoggle. 

   We're not sure who gave permission, but the Air Force finally unleashed its power. B-52s based in Thailand, Guam and one other country took the fight to Khe Sanh. Each bomber, with eight J-57 engines and 108 bombs (500 and 750-pounders), pulverized enemy positions for days. 

   Khe Sanh was won, as was every other engagement, including the Tet Offensive, despite Soviet supplies and our political mismanagement.

   But all the journalists in theater wanted to report was that Khe Sanh was our Dien Bien Phu, the 1954 French defeat - the very charge LBJ most feared. Fake news 50 years ago. 

   CBS's Walter Cronkite, America's anchor, went to a hotel in Saigon and declared the cause to be lost. Time to go home. 

   President Johnson groaned, "If I've lost Cronkite, I've lost the American people." The "war" dragged on a few more years after Nixon took office, promising to end it. 

      Jimmy